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ii. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Misapprehension of the Procedural History. 
The Court's opinion asserts that this Petition was not filed 
until after Appellant's Petition for Certiorari was denied by the 
Supreme Court of the United States on February 29, 1988. Andrews 
v. Shulson fsic]. No. 880024, filed October 27, 1988, at Slip op. 
2. This is incorrect. In fact, this Petition was filed on 
October 23, 1987, long before the Supreme Court's ruling on 
Appellant's Petition for Certiorari. The event that triggered 
the filing of this Petition was not the termination of the 
original federal habeas proceedings, but this Court's decision in 
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). See Affidavit of 
Timothy K. Ford, Petitioner's Addendum at 11. 
The facts surrounding this important aspect of the 
procedural history of this case are undisputed. The Court's 
opinion should be corrected to eliminate its misstatement on this 
point. 
2. Misapprehension of Federal Law. 
The Court has misapprehended the federal law regarding abuse 
of the writ, which it purports to follow. Slip op. at 3. The 
cases the Court relies upon all dealt with situations where 
"claims that could have been presented years ago were brought 
forward—often in a piecemeal fashion—only after the execution 
date is set or becomes imminent." See Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 
U.S. 377, 380 (1984); Anton v. Duqqer, 465 U.S. 200, 203 (1984); 
Straight v. Wainwriaht, 476 U.S. 1132, 1133 (1986). As noted 
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above, that was not the case here. In addition, all of the cases 
the opinion cites involved situations where the petitioner did 
"not explain why he failed to include his challenge ... in his 
prior habeas petition." Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. at 380; 
see Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. at 1134; Anton v. Dugger, 
465 U.S. at 206. Petitioner here offered several explanations 
and asked for an evidentiary hearing to prove any aspect of them 
the Respondent questioned. The Court's opinion assumes the 
record is complete on this point, overlooking that request for a 
hearing and the District Court1s erroneous denial of it. 
The Court also misapprehends federal law in its citation of 
several federal cases for the proposition that "raising issues in 
a petition that were not but could have been raised in a previous 
petition, except where good cause is shown, constitutes an abuse 
of the writ and requires dismissal of the petition." Slip op. at 
3. In reality, the federal courts hold that failure to assert a 
constitutional right or privilege at a time "when the right or 
privilege was of doubtful existence", followed by the assertion 
of the claim after a new United States Supreme Court precedent 
establishes its validity, "constitutes no abuse of the writ of 
habeas corpus." Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 126 (1968). Only 
one of the federal circuits has adopted the radically different 
rule this Court does, equating successive habeas corpus petitions 
based on new law with procedurally defaulted claims. Jones v. 
Estelle. 722 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1983). The other federal 
circuits hold to the contrary, and the issue is presently pending 
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before the Supreme Court of the United States. See Moore v. 
Kemp, 824 F.2d 874 (11th Cir. 1987), cert, granted, U.S. Supreme 
Court No. 87-1104 (April 18, 1988).1 
The Court also misapprehends federal law in its failure to 
recognize that the "abuse of the writ doctrine should be governed 
by equitable principles." Stephens v. Kemp, 104 S.Ct. 562, 563 
(1983); Sanders v. United States, 371 U.S. 117 (1963). The 
Court's opinion, while purporting to follow the federal rule in 
this area, overlooks that crucial part of it—which alone 
justifies review here, as Justice Durham's dissent points out. 
3. Failure to Address the Issue of the Right to Counsel. 
The Court's opinion overlooks, and does not address, the 
question of the right to appointed counsel in Utah post-
conviction proceedings. As Petitioner's Briefs have pointed out, 
this issue is relevant not only to the propriety of the trial 
court's refusal to appoint counsel to represent Petitioner below, 
but also to the question of "cause" for the alleged procedural 
default in the prior post-conviction petition, on which the 
Court's opinion rests. See Appellant's Brief at 45 n.31; 
Appellant's Reply Brief at 13 n.ll. 
On October 31, 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the en banc decision in Giarrantano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 
1118 (4th Cir. 1988), which held that there is a constitutional 
right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings in capital 
•^To minimize delay in federal review, the Court may wish to 
hold this Petition until Moore is decided and these federal law 
issues are resolved. 
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cases. Because this issue of Utah law is unresolved, and will 
inevitably have a direct impact on any federal court's assessment 
of this case on certiorari or in habeas corpus, the Court's 
opinion should address that question. 
4. Compounding the Constitutional Violation. 
The Court has granted Respondent's request that this Court 
depart from its prior practice, by refusing to address in any 
manner the merits of Petitioner's constitutional claims. 
Respondent asked this, not for any valid state reason, but for 
the sole purpose of cutting of Petitioner's access to federal 
court on these issues. By granting that request, the Court has 
constructed a special rule barring only the Petitioner's attempts 
to obtain review in this particular case. 
A state court procedural rule, constructed for the purpose 
of cutting off federal review of federal constitutional issues, 
is not an independent and adequate state ground. Henry v. 
Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). The federal courts will not, 
and should not, recognize bars imposed by state procedural rules 
unless they are "strictly or regularly" followed. Hathorn v. 
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262 (1982). The reasons for this "are 
plain: the state court may be attempting to evade Supreme Court 
review by interposing a state law ground." Meltzer, State Court 
Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 1128, 1138 (1986). 
The State's arguments in this case, followed by this Court's 
acceptance of them without explanation for its departure from 
past practice, can support no other inference but that this 
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c""«"«i "i, " ti action is specifically intended and designed \ :uL oil 
Petitioner's right federc death sentence that the 
State ^ncedec unconstitutional. 
Petitioner submits this is not a pror-.-'-r api. i ...: :u i->•!•• of state 
procedural rules n x. eason for this Court's decision 
not ; Ln any manner, the merits of Petitioner's 
constitutional claims, the opinion sh^ modified to set :it 
forth. If there other than that the Respondent has 
urqe<i-'• i,.o keep Petitioner's claims out of federc 
too, should be stated so that Peti i inner c*™ a©r. * federal 
courts adequacy and propriety - - ^ 
im Court's silence can only be interpreted nrmation 
the State's cynical and de1 efforts to insulate a 
fundamen tal I i ijustice from review. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court rehearing, address the merits of 
Pet i I i "Uiiex '"' «i constitutional claims and vacate hi,: rente-
death. At the least, the Cour
 m o d^ fy ^ts o p i n i o n 
correct its error-, i etjaiding the procedural history of thi \ 
and «, address the issues set out above. 
DATED this _ Wf da > •' •" A eiw^
 1988# 
Respectfully submitted, 
'<_• 
Timothy K. Ford f&>-^  
Attorney for Petitioner 
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